Suffering in Silence: Asylum Law and the Concealment of Political Opinion as a Form of Persecution Note by Smith, Peter J.
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2012 
Suffering in Silence: Asylum Law and the Concealment of Political 
Opinion as a Form of Persecution Note 
Peter J. Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Peter J., "Suffering in Silence: Asylum Law and the Concealment of Political Opinion as a Form of 




VOLUME 44 FEBRUARY 2012 IssuE 3
Note
SUFFERING IN SILENCE: ASYLUM LAW AND THE CONCEALMENT OF
POLITICAL OPINION AS A FORM OF PERSECUTION
PETER J. SMITH
In order to be granted asylum in the United States, an applicant has to
show that she has suffered persecution, or has a well-founded fear of
persecution, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. Under two different
rationales, developed through case law, concealment of one's religious
views may constitute persecution in itself A line of cases, beginning with
the Seventh Circuit decision Muhur v. Ashcroft, stands for the proposition
that an applicant may prove that she has a well-founded fear of
persecution if the only way to avoid persecution would be to conceal her
religious beliefs. Another rationale, first developed in the Third Circuit
case Fatin v. INS, holds that an asylum applicant cannot show that
concealment of her religion is persecution unless she shows that the act of
concealment would be "profoundly abhorrent" to her. The second
rationale thus creates a much higher standard for the applicant to meet.
This Note will argue that the forced concealment of one's political
opinion should be recognized as a form of persecution as well. In
recognition of the fundamental purpose of asylum law, as well as the
principles of international human rights and American democratic ideals,
it is entirely appropriate and desirable to afford the same protection for
political opinion applicants as religion applicants. This Note will consider
the application of both the Muhur and Fatin rationales to political opinion,
ultimately concluding that the approach developed in Muhur is the most
suitable and reasonable-both for applicants and immigration policy in
general.
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SUFFERING IN SILENCE: ASYLUM LAW AND THE CONCEALMENT OF
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PETER J. SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Silence is the universal refuge... a balm to our every chagrin."' The
refuge of silence may offer some protection for individuals afraid of
intolerant governments discovering their religious or political beliefs.
Ideas do not bear physical characteristics, and a closet dissident can avoid
detection much more easily than an ethnic minority with recognizable
physical features. A Christian in Saudi Arabia or a democrat in China, for
example, could live an entire life without detection if she never attended
religious services or openly expressed her political views. Those who do
practice their beliefs openly, thereby facing the risk of persecution, are
more likely to display the well-founded fear of persecution necessary to be
granted asylum in the United States.2 Unexpressed convictions, after all,
create less exposure to danger.
Concealment, however, is not a viable option for individuals with
strong convictions. To ask a Buddhist monk not to light incense or an
Orthodox Jew not to wear a yarmulke may be tantamount to requiring
renouncement of deeply held beliefs. Courts have emphasized that no one
should be expected to choose between abandoning his or her faith and
being persecuted.3 Some courts have even considered concealment of
one's religious beliefs to be a form of persecution in and of itself.4 In this
sense, silence is far from a balm or a refuge; it is a state of mental
suffering, from which refugees should be entitled to protection.
Religious beliefs are perceived as fundamental and inviolate; courts do
not expect people to hide or change their religion any more than they can
change the color of their skin. But people similarly define themselves
. Boston College, B.A. 2008; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2012. 1
would like to thank Professor Jon Bauer for his invaluable guidance and assistance throughout the
writing process. I would also like to thank the staff of the Connecticut Law Review for their diligent
editing and helpful feedback. I am especially grateful to my parents, Jordan and Christina, for their
enduring support. Any errors contained herein are mine and mine alone.
1 Henry David Thoreau, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, in WALDEN AND OThER
WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 301,435 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1965).
2 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (defining a refugee as an
individual with a "well-founded fear of persecution" on account of a protected ground).
3 See, e.g., Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the ability of the
asylum applicant to conceal his or her religion does not defeat the claim of religious persecution).
4See, e.g., Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[R]efusing to allow a
person to practice his religion is a common form of persecution.").
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according to their personal political views. An activist may practice her
deeply held political philosophy by lobbying, demonstrating peacefully,
and assembling with like-minded individuals with the same fervor as a
devout monk praying the rosary. To hide one's views and feign agreement
with the practices of an oppressive regime could be as psychologically
tormenting as renouncing one's religious faith. Being forced to conceal
one's political opinion, therefore, could be perceived as a form of
psychological persecution.
Stifling one's political speech to escape harm also runs contrary to the
purpose of political asylum: protecting an individual's right to free
expression in the face of government repression. Therefore, a person could
be considered to face "constructive persecution" even if she could-and
likely would-stay quiet to avoid being persecuted. Courts, generally,
have not yet taken either of these views; instead they have traditionally
focused on whether there is a reasonable possibility that the persecutors
will discover the individual's political beliefs and punish her for these
beliefs. As this Note will contend, however, the constructive persecution
approach has already been followed implicitly in the context of religion.
This Note examines how the very act of concealment of political
opinion may, in fact, constitute persecution, and argues that expanding
asylum law to protect against such persecution would be appropriate. Part
II reviews both the history of asylum law in the United States, and the
current statutory requirements for asylum. Part III focuses on persecution
on account of religion, and examines how some courts have considered
concealment of religious belief to be psychological or constructive
persecution. Part IV discusses how the concept of keeping quiet as a form
of persecution, as developed in the religion context, could be expanded to
political opinion and explores two standards from case law that courts
could follow. Part V analyzes the possible implications of these
approaches to political opinion asylum cases and explains why the
constructive persecution approach, derived from the religion cases, is the
most suitable-especially considering the similarities between religion and
political opinion. Part VI concludes with a recommended course of
judicial interpretation for the future.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF U.S. ASYLUM LAW
For as long as the United States has existed, it has been a destination
for people fleeing political and religious intolerance. In 1776, Thomas
Paine remarked: "This new world hath been the asylum for the persecuted
lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of Europe."5
Immigration law was relatively open and unregulated until the late
5 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 22 (Peter Eckler Publ'g 1914) (1776).
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nineteenth century, and the Puritans of Plymouth Rock,6 Russian Jews of
the nineteenth century,7 and Vietnamese "boat people" of the 1970s 8 all
saw the United States as a refuge from persecution. Beginning with the
Chinese Exclusion Laws in 1882, 9  however-and continuing with
immigration quotas in the 1920s-Congress began to actively attempt to
curb the rising flow of immigrants, and to keep out certain disfavored
ethnic groups.'0
Nevertheless, other avenues opened up for refugees seeking admission
on an ad hoc basis.1' First, starting after World War II, Congress began
enacting legislation to accept qualified individuals from specific countries
undergoing crises as refugees. 12  The Cuban revolution in 1959, for
example, led Congress to pass the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act,
allowing Cuban immigrants fleeing Fidel Castro's regime to stay in the
United States13  Second, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
("INA") gave the Attorney General the power to temporarily parole aliens
due to humanitarian or public interest concerns.1 4 The INA also authorized
the Attorney General to prevent the deportation of noncitizens to countries
6 See Joel H. Swift, To Insure Domestic Tranquility: The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 473, 478 (1988) (noting that the Puritans came to Plymouth for
religious freedom).
7 See Amir Steinhart, Note, Old Shtetlism and New Urbanism: Uncovering the Implications of
Suburban Zoning Laws for Community Life Through the Jewish-American Experience, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 255, 266-67 (2010) ("Seeking to escape the persecution that followed
the assassination of Alexander I of Russia in 1881, and dreaming of a land where they would not face
violent pogroms and stringent limitations on their livelihood and basic rights, hundreds of thousands of
panic-stricken Jews began pouring westward out of Russian territory.").
8 See Minh-Duc T. Le, Note, ROVR: Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Returnees or
Refoulement of Vietnamese Refugees?, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 125, 126 (1997) (describing the refugees
who escaped Vietnam by boat after the fall of Saigon in 1975).
9 E.g., Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943); see also Margot K.
Mendelson, Note, Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S, Immigration Courts, 119 YALE L.J.
1012, 1019 (2010) (describing the exclusion of Chinese laborers in the 1880s).
1o E.g., Emergency Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952) (setting annual
quotas at three percent of 1910 foreign-born population levels); see also Mendelson, supra note 9, at
1018-21 (detailing the first comprehensive immigration laws, intended to limit the number of
immigrants, especially from outside Northern Europe).
1 See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of
the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9, 10-11 (1981) ("Gradually, the United States
publicly assumed responsibility for refugees who were fleeing new conflicts in the developing world as
well as those displaced following World War II.").
12 See id at 12-13 ("Insofar as Congress was willing to make exceptions to the restrictive
immigration policy of the post-war era, refugees were admitted within narrowly circumscribed limits to
discharge responsibilities towards persons uprooted by [World War II], or as a gesture to the anti-
communist preoccupation of the Cold War Era.").
13 Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)).
14 8 U.S.C. § l182(dX5)(A); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 502 (2009) (stating that the application of the provision is
considered on a case-by-case basis).
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where they would face "physical persecution."' 5 Such protection, known
as withholding of removal, was initially discretionary, despite being
mandatory under the 1951 U.N. Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees ("Protocol"), 16 which the United States ratified in
1968 but failed to support with appropriate legislation until 1980.17
A. The Refugee Act of 1980
The United States fulfilled its obligations under the Protocol by
passing the Refugee Act in 1980.8 Not only did the Act make withholding
of removal mandatory for those who face persecution, but it also created a
new status designation that provided a path to permanent residence and
citizenship: asylum. 19 To be granted asylum or withholding of removal, an
applicant must be physically present in the United States and qualify as a
"refugee. 2°  Congress relied on the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees21 in defining a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.2
A noncitizen bears the burden of establishing his or her past
"s Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat 163, 214, amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 307(a), 110 Stat.
3009 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 123 1(b)(3)).
16 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
'7 See id. (indicating that the United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968); REGINA GERMAIN,
ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (6th ed. 2010)
(explaining that U.S. law initially did not conform with international obligations under the Protocol).
18 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
"9 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
20 1d. §§ 1158(a)(1)-(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3).
21 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ch. I, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter Convention] (defining a refugee as "any person who.., owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country").
2 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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persecution, or well-founded fear of future persecution, based on one of
five protected grounds before an asylum officer or immigration judge.24
Courts have generally held that the persecutor may either be the
government or a private actor that the government is unable or unwilling to
control.2' The Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security may
then grant asylum status at his or her discretion to an alien who meets the
refugee definition and is not ineligible under various statutory bars.26  An
asylum seeker may be ineligible, for example, if she firmly resettled in
another country after leaving the country of persecution, failed to apply for
asylum within one year after entering the United States, or has engaged in
terrorist activities or associations at any time. An individual meeting the
definition who fails to obtain asylum must still be granted withholding of
removal if his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the home
country.28 A prerequisite for both of these designations is the ability to
meet the statutory definition of "refugee," including its requirement of a
"well-founded fear" of persecution.
B. The "Well-Founded Fear" Standard
The term of art "well-founded fear," as used in the definition of
refugee, has sparked considerable discussion within immigration law due
to its ambiguity. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") held in In re
Acosta29 that a "well-founded fear of persecution" is equivalent to a "clear
probability of persecution," the standard for withholding of removal. 30 The
23 Past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution, which the government
can overcome by showing that there has been a change in country conditions that removes the
applicant's well-founded fear of persecution or that the applicant could reasonably be expected to
relocate to a different part of his or her country to avoid persecution. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1),
1208.13(b)(1) (2010). Even if the Government meets its burden and the applicant does not have a well-
founded fear of persecution, he or she may still be granted asylum if he or she has shown "compelling
reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past
persecution" or "that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon
removal to that country." Id. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(iii), 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).
24 8 U.S.C. § I 158(b)(1)(B)(i).
25E.g., Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004); Abdulrahman v. Ashcrofi, 330
F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003); Valioukevitch v. INS, 251 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001).
26 8 U.S.C. § I 158(b)(1)(A).
27 Id. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), 1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).
28 Id. § 123 1(b)(3) ("[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney
General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the
alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."). The
individual has to show that it is more likely than not that he or she will face persecution. INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,430 (1987). An individual is barred from withholding if he or she has
persecuted other individuals, committed a particularly serious crime, or is a danger to the security of
the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
29 19 [.&N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).30 Id. at 229.
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Supreme Court, however, overruled this holding. In 1987, in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,31 the Court held that the withholding standard was
stricter than the asylum standard, and an individual may pass the "well-
founded fear" test even if there is a less than fifty percent chance of
persecution in his or her home country.32 Indeed, the actual probability of
being punished for illegitimate reasons may be as little as ten percent as
long as the applicant has an objectively reasonable fear of such
punishment.33
Before persecuting an individual for a protected characteristic, the
persecutor first must become aware of that characteristic. In In re Acosta,
the BIA held that the alien has to demonstrate that "the persecutor is
already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses th[e]
belief or characteristic" that is the basis for the persecution.34 Two years
later, after the Supreme Court overruled Acosta's "clear probability"
standard, the BIA responded by dropping the word "easily" in In re
Mogharrabi.35 The BIA acknowledged that it was loosening the standard
when it held that "it is enough for the applicant to show that the persecutor
could become aware that the applicant possesses the belief or characteristic
in question. 36 Nonetheless, only a year after Mogharrabi, the BIA held in
In re Vigil37 that a Salvadorian national had not established a well-founded
fear of persecution-based on his neutral stance during the civil war-
because he had not affirmatively stated his neutrality.38 Instead, the
applicant had stayed quiet about his wish to remain neutral, as such,
reasoned the court, there was no reasonable threat of the guerillas
discovering his neutrality and targeting him for recruitment because of it.
39
Taken together, these opinions suggest that there must be at least a
reasonable chance of the persecutor discovering the applicant's trait for the
applicant to fear persecution on account of it; therefore, an individual who
fails to assert her political views openly may not be able to demonstrate the
requisite well-founded fear.
31 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
32Id. at 431.
33 See id. (stating that even someone with a ten percent chance of being killed could have an
objectively reasonable, well-founded fear of persecution); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir.
2000) ("An alien's fear may be well-founded even if there is only a slight, though discernible, chance
of persecution.").
4In re Acosta, 19 . & N. at 226.
31 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987).36 Id (emphasis added).
17 19 1. & N. Dec. 572 (BIA 1988).
31 Id. at 576-77.
39Id. at 577.
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C. Protected Grounds as Immutable or Fundamental Characteristics
The persecution an asylum applicant fears has to be on account of one
of the five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.40  The Supreme Court has
interpreted "on account of' to mean that the persecution is motivated by
the persecutor's hostility towards some characteristic held by the
individual, rather than by a generalized political or religious motive for
persecution.4' For example, the applicant may show that that he or she is
an active member of a protest group whose members the government
punishes for their opposition,42 or that members of his or her religion are
specifically targeted for oppression.43 An applicant may also be eligible
for protection even if the persecutor merely imputes one of the five
protected characteristics to her.44 Protection does not, however, extend to
46those who fear harm solely from a civil war45 or a personal vendetta.
Persecutors may have mixed motives, but the protected characteristic of
the asylum seeker has to be "at least one central reason" for the
47persecution.4
40 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (2006).
41 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992). In Elias-Zacarias, the Court held that a
guerilla organization was acting out of a generalized political motive in forcibly recruiting members,
not on account of the victim's political opinion, especially since the guerillas had no knowledge of the
victim's neutral political stance. Id.
42 See Canjuna-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a Salvadorian
national established a clear probability of persecution in his country because of his activity with the
Popular League, an opposition group that the government persecuted).
43 See Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 756-57 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding the immigration
judge's denial of asylum for a Catholic Bengali individual whose testimony and supporting letter from
a parish priest established that Catholics faced harassment, threats, and violence in Bangladesh); see
also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii), 1208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2010) (stating that the applicant does not have to
show that he or she would be singled out for persecution if he or she demonstrates in his or her country
that there is a pattern of "persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant" on the
basis of a protected ground, and "the applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and
identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is
reasonable").
4 In re S-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 486, 490 (BIA 1996) (affirming that persecution on account of an
imputed political opinion can give rise to a valid asylum claim); GERMAIN, supra note 17, at 44
("When the persecution inflicted on the asylum applicant is because of an imputed characteristic related
to any one of the five protected grounds, the persecution is 'on account of that characteristic,
regardless of whether the applicant possesses it.").45 1n re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985) (stating that "physical injury arising out of
civil strife or anarchy in a country did not constitute persecution" according to the pre-Refugee Act
meaning of persecution, and this interpretation remains the same under the Refugee Act).46 In re Y-G-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 794, 799 (BIA 1994) ("Aliens fearing retribution over purely
personal matters will not be granted asylum on that basis.").
47 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006); see also In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212-13
(BIA 2007), affd as modified by Ndayshimiye v. Att'y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 133 (3d Cir. 2009)
(determining that an asylum applicant's persecutor may have more than one motive but one of the five
protected grounds must be at least one central reason for the persecution).
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The protection of these five characteristics underscores their centrality
in international human rights discourse. The BIA has reasoned that all of
these grounds are protected because they are either immutable or so
fundamental that individuals are generally not expected to change them. It
articulated this interpretation in Acosta in the course of defining the most
ambiguous ground, membership in a particular social group ("PSG"). The
BIA drew an analogy to the other protected grounds, such as religion or
political opinion, in determining that members of a PSG must share a
common trait that "the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences." 48 The BIA rested this definition on
the fact that all five of these traits define an individual's identity, and to
require a person to change them would violate his fundamental rights.
Applying the standard, the BIA, in subsequent cases, has interpreted the
PSG ground to include members of a tribe or clan,49 homosexuals, 50 and
women who oppose genital mutilation, 51 acknowledging that these groups
all may fear persecution based on their fundamental group characteristics.
III. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE CONCEALMENT OF AN
INDIVIDUAL'S BELIEFS
Before examining concealment of political opinion, it is worth
considering concealment of religion, for which more extensive case law
has been developed. Asylum law protects individuals who have suffered
religious persecution or have a well-founded fear of such persecution.
Persecution on account of religion may consist of being targeted for being
a member of a religious group, for expressing religious beliefs, or for
engaging in religious practices such as wearing distinctive clothing or
observing certain holidays. 2 In addition, it may include punishment
resulting from refusal to follow the religious norms and codes of society,
53
48 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233. This definition has been accepted by all courts of appeal that
have considered it. E.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011); Bi Xia Qu v.
Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2010); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665-66 (9th Cir.
2010); Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1087-88 (7th Cir. 2006); Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464
F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2006).
49 In re H-, 211. & N. Dec. 337, 338 (BIA 1996).
50 In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822-23 (BIA 1990).
51 In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996).
12 See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Religion-Based
Refugee Claims Under Article ]A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 3-4, U.N. Doe. HCR/GIP/04/06 (Apr. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBl.4Od8427a4.pdf ("Claims based on 'religion' may involve one or
more of the following elements: a) religion as belief (including non-belief); b) religion as identity; c)
religion as way of life.").
" See In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1336-37 (BIA 2000) (holding that a Moroccan girl who
had been beaten by her father for her refusal to cover herself and stay in the house had established a
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or conversion from one religion to another.54 To prevail on a claim of
religious persecution, the applicant also has to show not only that her home
country persecutes individuals belonging to, believing in, or practicing a
particular religion, but that she is a genuine believer, practitioner, or
member of that religion.55
An applicant with religious beliefs that are not tolerated by an
oppressive regime may find that renouncing these beliefs is the only way to
avoid persecution. But the believer could also hold onto these beliefs and
simply conceal them from the authorities by refraining from any public
expression or practice that might draw attention to the individual's hidden
beliefs. Such a choice, though, may be exceptionally difficult or even
psychologically tormenting for the firm believer.
A. The Concealment of Religious Beliefs to Avoid Persecution
In religion cases, courts generally have been unwilling to deny asylum
applications when the applicant could avoid persecution by concealing his
or her beliefs. The Seventh Circuit, in particular, has repeatedly affirmed
this principle in reviewing BIA decisions. In Muhur v. Ashcroft,56 the
court vacated a BIA decision upholding an immigration judge's denial of
the applicant's asylum application on the basis that she would not face
persecution in Eritrea because, even if she was a Jehovah's Witness, she
was not an active one, and thus would not attract the ire of the Eritrean
authorities.57 Judge Posner scathingly criticized the immigration judge's
assumption that an individual is not entitled to asylum if he or she can
avoid persecution by keeping his or her religious beliefs quiet.58 To expose
the immigration judge's error in concluding that the applicant would not
unreasonably draw attention to herself, Judge Posner drew an analogy to
the early Christians who were persecuted by the Romans: "[They] faced
little risk of being thrown to the lions if they practiced their religion in
claim for asylum based on her religious belief in a liberal understanding of Islam, which differed from
her father's Orthodox Muslim beliefs).
54 See Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a convert from Islam
to Christianity may have a well-founded fear of being discovered and persecuted by the Iranian
government).
55 Immigration officers will sometimes quiz asylum applicants with basic theological questions
relating to his or her purported religion. See GERMAIN, supra note 17, at 45 (providing background on
the debate surrounding religious knowledge quizzes); see also Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d
Cir. 2006) (stating that an applicant can establish the sincerity of his or her religious faith while lacking
fully complete knowledge of religious doctrine).
56 355 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2004).
17Id. at 960.
58 Id. at 960 ("But the fatal flaw in the immigration judge's opinion lies... in the assumption-a
clear error of law-that one is not entitled to claim asylum on the basis of religious persecution
if... one can escape the notice of the persecutors by concealing one's religion.") (internal citations
omitted).
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secret; it doesn't follow that Rome did not persecute Christians, or that a
Christian who failed to conceal his faith would be acting 'unreasonably.'
59
This conclusion seems to imply that religious believers should not be
expected to practice in secret to avoid persecution for their beliefs.
The following year, Judge Posner restated this point in lao v.
Gonzales6 -vacating the denial of an asylum application for a member of
Falun Gong, a group that has been outlawed by the Chinese government.61
Chinese authorities persecute Falun Gong members by sending them to
prisons and reeducation centers, where they face torture and hard labor.62
Judge Posner explained that Falun Gong members suffer persecution that
can only be avoided by concealment, which does not indicate the absence
of a well-founded fear, but actually proves its existence as a motivation for
concealment.63
One of the Seventh Circuit's most recent and well-articulated
reaffirmations of this principle came in the 2010 case Shan Zhu Qiu v.
Holder.64 Qiu, a Chinese national and private Falun Gong practitioner,
fled to Chicago to apply for asylum after his master was arrested and
police came to his house several times with summonses.65  The
immigration judge denied Qiu's petition for asylum, questioning the
validity of the summonses and finding that there was not enough evidence
to show that Qiu would be punished if he returned to China.66 The BIA
agreed, emphasizing the uncertainty of the level of punishment Qiu might
face.67 The Seventh Circuit, however, observed that the police came to
Qiu's house just three months after he started secretly practicing Falun
Gong, indicating that they were looking for low-level members as well as
leaders.68 If Qiu continued practicing Falun Gong in China, his fear of
suffering severe penalties would have been very reasonable. 69 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that "the only way Qiu can avoid persecution is to cease
the practice of Falun Gong or hope to evade discovery. Putting Qiu to
such a choice runs contrary to the language and purpose of our asylum
59 Id.
6o400 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2005).
61 Id. at 532. The movement has been called a religion, a cult, or merely an exercise regimen with
a spiritual focus. Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, 611 F.3d 403, 404 (7th Cir. 2010); lao, 400 F.3d at 532.
62 Qiu, 611 F.3d at 407.
63 lao, 400 F.3d at 532.
'4 611 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2010).
" Id. at 404-05.
66Id. at 406.
67 Id. ("The Board seemed to agree that Qiu was indeed in for some type of punishment in China,
but found that Qiu could not prove how harsh it was going to be."). The Board also assumed that since
Qiu only practiced for three months, he was a low-level practitioner who faced a lesser degree of
punishment. Id. at 407.
8Id.
69 Id. at 407-08.
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laws., 70 The court emphasized that "[a]sylum exists to protect people from
having to return to a country and conceal their beliefs. 71
Other circuit courts have also been reluctant to require concealment of
one's religion as a way to avoid persecution. The Ninth Circuit, in Zhang
v. Ashcroft,n proclaimed that requiring a Falun Gong member who feared
persecution to practice secretly is "contrary to our basic principles of
religious freedom and the protection of religious refugees. ' '73 Although the
applicant was ineligible for asylum, the court found that he would more
likely than not face persecution in China if he practiced openly and
overturned the immigration judge's denial of withholding of removal. 74
The Eleventh Circuit also agreed with Judge Posner's reasoning in Muhur,
even going so far as to state that "having to practice religion underground
to avoid punishment is itself a form of persecution., 75  Recently Judge
Posner has reiterated, in dicta, that "refusing to allow a person to practice
his religion is a common form of persecution even though the only harm it
causes is psychological. 76
These religious persecution cases remove the traditional requirement
that applicants show a reasonable possibility of the persecutor becoming
aware of their religious beliefs. Under the reasoning of these cases, an
applicant who would refrain from religious practices or expression, and as
a result would avoid any possibility of persecution, can still be considered
to have a "well-founded fear." The courts' willingness to find persecution
in the absence of a reasonable chance of detection potentially has one of
two meanings. Either keeping a belief concealed is considered a kind of
persecution in and of itself because of the degree of psychological pain it
imposes on the believer; or, concealment is such a disfavored option, so
inimical to the purpose of asylum law and international norms, that it
constitutes a sort of constructive persecution. In the latter case, the
likelihood of persecution would be assessed on the basis of what would
happen if the individual practiced her religion openly, even if, in reality,
the person would conceal her beliefs to avoid persecution. The sections
that follow consider each of these possible rationales in depth.
70 Id. at 409.
71 Id. at 408.
72 388 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2004).
7 3
Id. at 719.
I4 1d. at 717, 721-22.
75 Kazemzadeh v. Att'y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1354 (1 1th Cir. 2009); see also Bucur v. INS, 109
F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that persecution may include forbidding members of a religious
group, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, from practicing openly).
76 Stanoikova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2011).
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B. Psychological Persecution When Compliance is "Profoundly
Abhorrent"
"Persecution" typically evokes images of physical torture, serious
bodily harm, or imprisonment, but these outcomes are not always
necessary for the purposes of asylum law.77 In fact, there is no singular
definition of persecution apart from the very general definition the BIA
provided in Acosta: "harm or suffering... inflicted upon an individual in
order to punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor
seeks to overcome.,7 8  Without an established list of acts that constitute
persecution, courts give meaning to the term on a case-by-case basis. For
example, the BIA and courts have been receptive to the claim that severe
economic deprivation is a form of persecution.79 Courts have been clear
that persecution must be more than mere discrimination or harassment, but
the distinction between harassment and persecution remains vague.80
The infliction of mental suffering, without physical harm or
imprisonment, has been recognized as a form of persecution by the BIA
and circuit courts. For example, threats that are so menacing, imminent,
and concrete that they cause "significant actual suffering or harm" may
amount to persecution.8' In addition, children who witness the violence
and loss of freedom suffered by their family members may be able to show
that they have endured mental suffering sufficient to constitute
persecution.82 The pain suffered from emotional distress can, in many
cases, have more severe, enduring consequences than pain from physical
injuries. It follows that an asylum applicant who can assert a genuine fear
of suffering severe psychological torment may hold a well-founded fear of
" Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
781n re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 223 (BIA 1985). Circuit Courts of Appeals have provided
similarly general definitions. See, e.g., Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that
persecution includes non-life threatening violence and physical abuse); De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d
1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1993) (defining persecution as "punishment or the infliction of harm for political,
religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize as legitimate").
79 See, e.g., In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 168-69 (BIA 2007) (finding that threats of loss of
employment if the applicant did not have an abortion could constitute persecution if it would result in
severe economic disadvantage).
80 Sofinet v. INS, 196 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The conduct in question need not
necessarily threaten the petitioner's 'life or freedom;' however, it must rise above the level of mere
'harassment' to constitute persecution."); see also Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir.
2003) (finding that police questioning and searches of the home constitute harassment, not
persecution); Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that harassment will likely not
rise to the level of persecution without "evidence of detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution,
imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture").
"IChavarria v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Li v. Att'y Gen., 400 F.3d
157, 164 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Intentional infliction of mental suffering
can also constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1),
1208.18(a)(1) (2010).




Forced compliance with laws that violate an individual's beliefs can
give rise to a claim of psychological persecution as well. The seminal case
on this issue is Fatin v. INS,83 a Third Circuit decision. In Fatin, the court
affirmed the BIA's rejection of an Iranian woman's asylum claim, but
84discussed the standards for stating a claim of psychological persecution.
The applicant argued both that the fundamentalist Islamic regime that came
to power in 1979 would force her to engage in Muslim practices-such as
wearing a chador (veil)--and that she would be punished if she did not
comply. 85 She based her claim on a gender-based PSG, attesting that she
was a member of a group of "Iranian women who find their country's
gender-specific laws offensive and do not wish to comply with them.",
86
Then Judge Samuel Alito agreed with the BIA that she failed to show a
well-founded fear of persecution.87 He noted that the applicant complained
most fervently about having to wear a veil, but she asserted only that she
would try to avoid wearing one, rather than refuse and face the
88consequences. Upon returning to Iran, she had two options: comply with
the laws or be persecuted by the authorities. 89 The court was unconvinced
that compliance would constitute persecution.9" It considered significant
the fact that the applicant would not refuse to comply, implying that
resisting repressive laws is a strong indication that compliance with these
laws would inflict severe mental suffering.91 Judge Alito concluded that
"the petitioner's testimony in this case simply does not show that, for her,
the requirement of wearing the chador or complying with Iran's other
gender-specific laws would be so profoundly abhorrent that it could aptly
be called persecution. 92 Following this reasoning, an applicant cannot
establish a fear of psychological persecution without demonstrating that
the required practice would be abhorrent to the applicant's deeply held
beliefs.93 The court opined that requiring someone to renounce his or her
religion or desecrate a holy object could be regarded as a form of mental
torture, and thus rise to the level of persecution.
94
83 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
841d. at 1242.
" Id. at 1236.
86 Id. at 1241. She also claimed that she was persecuted due to her political opinion of "'freedom
of choice, freedom of expression [and] equality of opportunity for both sexes,"' id. at 1237, but the
court considered this to be essentially identical to her PSG claim. Id. at 1242.87 Id. at 1243.
88 Id. at 1241.
89 Id. at 1242.
90Id.






This psychological analysis is largely subjective; it relies on the
applicant's personal reaction based on the strength of her beliefs and the
degree of suffering that she would endure by acting counter to those
beliefs.95  A nominal Christian, for example, may not feel persecuted if
asked to take off her decorative cross necklace and throw it on the ground,
whereas a devout Catholic might.
The standard articulated in Fatin has been followed in other cases
involving compliance with religious dress codes. In Yadegar-Sargis v.
INS,96 the Seventh Circuit held that an Armenian Christian woman living
in Iran was not eligible for asylum because the Islamic dress code she
would have had to comply with was not sufficiently abhorrent to her
religious beliefs.97 In that case, although the woman complained about the
practice, she still wore the garb and was not prevented from attending
church.98 In Safaie v. INS,99 the Eighth Circuit similarly denied an Iranian
woman's asylum claim on the basis of her opposition to the required
Islamic dress code.100 The court was unconvinced that the applicant would
find compliance with the laws so profoundly abhorrent that it would rise to
the level of persecution, because her opposition was "not of the depth and
intensity required."' 01
In another case, the Ninth Circuit initially vacated the BIA's denial of
an asylum claim for a woman who was forced to comply with the Islamic
dress code in Iran.'0 2 A panel of the court agreed with the Third Circuit
that when an individual is "required to conform to, or is punished for
failing to comply with, laws that fundamentally are abhorrent to that
person's deeply held religious convictions, the resulting anguish should be
considered in determining whether the authorities have engaged in
'extreme conduct' that is 'tantamount to persecution."" 0 3 On rehearing en
banc, the Ninth Circuit did not reject the notion that an applicant's forced
compliance with certain laws can amount to mental suffering that rises to
95 Judge Alito also mentioned in a footnote that part of this analysis must be objective, such that a
reasonable person would find the situation profoundly abhorrent. Id. at 1242 n.l I ("We do not suggest
that an alien could establish that he or she would be persecuted or has a well-founded fear of
persecution based solely on his or her subjective reactions. Presumably, conduct could not constitute
persecution or 'torture' within Acosta unless an objective requirement is also satisfied.").
96 297 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2002).
9 7
d. at 605.
9 Id. at 604-05.
9' 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994).
Old. at 640-41.
11 Id. at 640 (basing its conclusion on the findings that "Safaie wore the mandatory garb
beginning in 1982, that she was not harmed or mistreated for smoking or wearing makeup, that she did
not assert 'some missionary fever' to defy the law, and that Safaie would be able to avoid further
demonstration of her opposition to the restrictions").
102 Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366, 1366-67, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), rev'den banc, 79
F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
103 Id. at 1375 (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 nn.9-10, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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the level of persecution, but held that the applicant failed to show that she
met the standard. The court emphasized that she had not been personally
singled out for punishment on account of her religious or political views
and that she had not shown that she would intentionally violate the law due
to her views and face persecution as a result.' °4
Courts in other countries have also recognized the possibility of
psychological persecution in this context. For example, the New Zealand
Refugee Status Appeals Authority ("RSAA") cited both Fatin and Fisher
in granting refugee status to an Iranian woman who opposed the
oppression of women in Iranian society. 05 The RSAA agreed with these
American courts that persecution might include being compelled to follow
laws that an individual finds abhorrent to her beliefs. 1 6
It is possible to interpret Muhur and its progeny in the context of the
Fatin line of cases. The reluctance of some courts to require someone to
return to a country where the only way to avoid physical harm is to stop
practicing a banned religion may arise from the idea that such a situation
constitutes psychological persecution.10 7  The concealment of religion
cases, however, have never explicitly discussed the psychological effects
of concealment as part of their analysis. An altemative notion better
explains the recent case law on concealment of religious beliefs.
C. An Alternative View: Muhur and Constructive Persecution
Persecution suffered by religious believers who are compelled to keep
quiet to avoid punishment might also be described as "constructive."
Constructive persecution would arise where the act of concealment
required an individual to give up a right so fundamental-such as the
practice of her religion-that it became a choice which "runs contrary to
the language and purpose of" asylum. 10 8 Consequently, the court should
104 Fisher, 79 F.3d at 962-63. ("Fisher failed to show that Iran punished her because of her
religious or political beliefs, or that, if she returned to Iran, she would violate the regulations because of
her beliefs, thereby triggering government action.").
105 Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 Re MN, at 12 (New Zealand,
Feb. 1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b741 c.html.106 Id. In that case, the court found that the applicant's loss of freedom of thought and conscience
by the Iranian authorities through the mandatory Islamic dress code might qualify as mental
persecution. Describing the intermingling of politics and religion in a theocratic society like Iran, the
RSAA found that the woman feared persecution on account of political opinion in addition to religion.
Id
107 Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Kazemzadeh v. Att'y Gen.,
577 F.3d 1341, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009) (Marcus, J., concurring) (stating the view that "any requirement
that Kazemzadeh abandon his faith or practice in secret in order to conceal his conversion amounts to
religious persecution under our asylum laws[,]" though it is unclear whether Judge Marcus would
consider such religious persecution psychological).
108 Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, 611 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at
1354 ("[H]aving to practice religion underground to avoid punishment is itself a form of persecution.").
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only consider what will happen if the individual expresses her beliefs.
This approach would not dwell on the extent of the mental suffering felt by
the applicant in concealing her beliefs or on whether the person would
actually express these beliefs. The primary analysis of the court would be
whether the applicant held a genuine belief that she wished to express, and
whether such expression, if it occurred, would create a well-founded fear
of persecution. Muhur, and its progeny, could be read to support this
approach-rather than the psychological persecution approach-because
the various courts focused on the applicant's religious adherence and the
desire to practice openly, rather than how the applicant would feel if asked
to keep quiet.109 It assumes that asking a sincere believer not to practice
constitutes persecution of a psychological nature, without inquiring
whether it is "profoundly abhorrent" for the particular applicant to refrain
from religious practice.
This formulation of constructive persecution would be consistent with
how persecution has traditionally been understood by the Seventh Circuit.
The court has defined "persecution" as "punishment or the infliction of
harm for political, religious, or other reasons that this country does not
recognize as legitimate."' 10 Suppression of one's religious belief to avoid
punishment may properly be considered an illegitimate act in light of the
general American interest in protecting the rights of free expression and
religious exercise the world-over.
Following this line of reasoning, it is possible that concealment of
essential characteristics other than religion could constitute constructive or
psychological persecution as well.
IV. CONCEALMENT OF POLITICAL OPINION
The BIA and Courts of Appeals frequently grant asylum protection to
activists fleeing governments that could discover their strongly-held
political convictions and persecute them accordingly. Courts have not yet
addressed whether being compelled to renounce political beliefs or to
remain silent about them is persecution in itself. A court disinclined to
protect concealment of political opinion could choose to follow the
Mogharrabi approach. If, however, a court decided to apply the concept of
concealment as persecution to the ground of political opinion, it could
either follow the Fatin approach of psychological persecution or the Muhur
approach of constructive persecution.
"9gE.g., Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1353 ("The Board found that Kazemzadeh's conversion to
Christianity is genuine, and it is undisputed that apostasy is a capital offense in Iran. Kazemzadeh's
petition depends on whether the record compels a fmding of a reasonable possibility that he will be
persecuted for being a convert.").
110 De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 44:1021
SUFFERING IN SILENCE
A. An Overview of Political Opinion and the Mogharrabi Approach
Authoritarian regimes hold power by suppressing political dissent, and
asylum law protects those dissidents who face persecution. According to
Mogharrabi, an asylum applicant has to show not only a critical view of
his or her government, but that the government could become aware of this
view and is able and willing to punish the applicant because of it.1 '1 The
more outspoken the activist, the easier it is to meet this standard." 2 Even
when activists could easily evade retaliation by keeping quiet, they are not
expected to. 13  But they are generally required to show that they have
expressed, or will express, a critical opinion that could come to the
attention of the authorities." 4 According to a handbook published by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
There may ... also be situations in which the applicant has
not given any expression to his opinions. Due to the
strength of his convictions, however, it may be reasonable
to assume that his opinions will sooner or later find
expression and that the applicant will, as a result, come
into conflict with the authorities. Where this can
reasonably be assumed, the applicant can be considered to
have fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion.115
Under this view, ascertaining whether there is a well-founded fear of
persecution depends on the level of conviction the asylum applicant holds
for his or her political beliefs. Courts, then, must assume the difficult task
of determining whether someone's political stance is so strong that he will
eventually feel compelled to speak out. Such a determination allows ample
"' In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987).
112 See Ian Atkinson, Note, Assumption of Risk in United States Refugee Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L.
273, 300 (2008) ("A political opinion applicant will normally have to show that he has affirmatively
taken sides in a dispute to receive protection, putting the politically neutral applicant in a worse
position than the applicant actively broadcasting an opinion that could bring about repercussions.").
"13 Id. at 299 ("[Pjersecution could be avoided easily through the simple expedient of keeping
quiet. Refugee law, however, does not require the activist to keep quiet even though the activist
assumes the risk of persecution by speaking out.").
14 See, e.g., Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that an individual
who has only expressed his views on Internet chat rooms does not have an objectively reasonable fear
of persecution).
115 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status, 82, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/EngREV.1 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook],
available at http://www.unhcr.org/pubi/PUBL/3d58el3b4.pdf. As the Supreme Court has explained,
the UNHCR Handbook does not have the force of law but still "provides significant guidance in
construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in




room for judicial skepticism about the likelihood of an individual actually
speaking out when he has so far remained silent.
Following Mogharrabi and the approach suggested by the UNHCR
Handbook, unexpressed political opinions may generate a well-founded
fear only if those opinions are reasonably likely to come to the attention of
the authorities. It is problematic, though, for asylum protection to turn on
whether an applicant has expressed her political views or can prove that
she probably would express them in the future. Such a standard assumes,
without substantiation, that only political views that compel applicants to
speak out are strong enough to deserve protection, ignoring the fact that
applicants who intend to conceal their views may nonetheless greatly fear
being discovered. The Mogharrabi approach mistakenly shifts the analysis
away from the genuineness of the applicant's views and requires applicants
to characterize themselves as activists who will likely attract attention.'
16
This approach is flawed because it denies protection to applicants with
strong political views who will keep silent in their home countries out of a
legitimate fear that expressing these views will lead to severe punishment
or even death. These individuals will not publicly express their views, but
their fear of persecution is no less sincere. Courts have not yet adequately
addressed whether a concealed political opinion that will likely remain
concealed may give rise to a claim of persecution, as some courts have
held it may on the grounds of religion.
B. Application of the Fatin Psychological Persecution Approach to
Political Opinion
Fatin primarily addressed gender-based PSG claims, but
acknowledged that its analysis would also apply to a related political
opinion claim. 117 Under Fatin's psychological persecution approach, an
asylum applicant would have to show that following the governmental
policy would be so abhorrent to that individual's deepest political beliefs
that it could be regarded as a form of "torture."'" 8  The ordinary
understanding of these strong words creates a very high burden. Abhorrent
is defined in the dictionary as "so repugnant as to stir up positive
116 This burden is akin to the one facing homosexual asylum applicants, who often may worry
whether they are visibly "gay enough" for the judge to believe their claim that they would be
discovered and persecuted for their sexual orientation. Dan Bilefsky, Gays Seeking Asylum in U.S.
Encounter a New Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at Al 9.
117 Indeed, Iranian women who disobey laws to wear veils in public often consider this a political
act, even if courts do not. See Olivia F. Cleaver, Note, Women Who Defy Social Norms: Female
Refugees Who Flee Islamic States and Their Fight to Fit into American Immigration Law, 7 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 6, 21 (2006) ("When a woman is required to put on a veil when she enters the public
sphere, and refuses to do so, she is, among other things, making a political statement that the law
requiring such clothing is unjust.").
"' Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 44:1021
SUFFERING IN SILENCE
antagonism" such that the act causing it has offended something highly-
revered or sacred." 19
It certainly would not be impossible to call keeping quiet about one's
political opposition to the government "profoundly abhorrent." For
example, a democrat in China, compelled to keep silent for fear of reprisal,
could argue that not being able to express her beliefs openly is deeply
offensive to her beliefs. Those who prevail, however, would likely be the
most fervent, impassioned political activists. They are more likely to be
able to credibly assert that they would actually refuse to keep quiet about
their views even when threatened by the government, as the applicant in
Fatin failed to do.
Without evidence of outward expression of beliefs, a judge has to rely
on his or her own determination of the credibility of the applicant's
testimony regarding the strength of the applicant's beliefs. An approach
that relies so heavily on an applicant's testimony regarding the
offensiveness to her beliefs may benefit religious claims more than
political opinion claims. That is, even a religious layperson, who asserts
that being prevented from openly practicing his faith is abhorrent, may be
more likely to be believed by the judge than an individual asserting a
political opinion claim. Adjudicators often assume that religion is more
fundamental and harder to conceal than political opinion because of the
impression, however flawed, that religion is more central to an individual's
psyche. 120  For instance, in explaining the concept of "profound
abhorrence," Judge Alito used the example of desecration of a holy object
rather than a political symbol.121 In addition, religious applicants are more
likely to give convincing conversion stories and personal professions of
how their faith has transformed their lives, while the views of political
dissidents are contextual and partly defined by their opposition to a
specific political regime.
C. Expansion of the Muhur Constructive Persecution Approach
The Seventh Circuit, in a line of cases starting with Muhur, has
fashioned an alternative, and less stringent, method for resolving cases
involving concealment of beliefs: constructive persecution. The approach
119 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 2 (11 th ed. 2005).
120 This could be due to cultural biases on the part of American judges, since polls show that
47.4% of Americans consider religion to be very important in their lives, compared with eleven percent
who consider politics to be very important in their lives. Online Data Analysis, WORLD VALUES
SURVEY, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVVSAnalize.jsp (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (follow "Begin
analysis" hyperlink; then follow "WVS 2005-2008" hyperlink; then click "United States of America"
and follow "Confirm selection" hyperlink; then follow "(V7) Important in life: Politics" hyperlink; then
follow "Cross-tabs" hyperlink; then follow "(V9) Important in life: Religion" tab from drop-down
window).
121 Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242.
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states generally that individuals who can avoid persecution for their
religious beliefs by concealing them, or by refraining from practice, are not
expected to do so to be eligible for asylum.122 Applicants need not be the
most visible adherents, but they must have religious beliefs that their
government could discover and suppress if they practiced openly.' 23  The
cases that illustrate this concept, such as Muhur, Iao, and Qiu, have so far
only considered religious beliefs and practice, 124 but the same rule can be
applied to political opinion.
Two of the Seventh Circuit's cases, as well as Zhang from the Ninth
Circuit, concern Falun Gong members. Although Falun Gong members
deny any political viewpoint, the Chinese government has banned the
group and jailed its members due to a perceived anti-government
agenda. 125  In fact, the Chinese government only started banning the
practice after the group staged an apparent pro-democracy protest in 1999,
indicating that China is intolerant of Falun Gong's perceived political
stance.126 Therefore, concealment of Falun Gong membership may qualify
as persecution not only on religious grounds, but also imputed political
opinion grounds. 127 Members of a purely political group could point to
Zhang in arguing that they too should be protected from being compelled
to conceal their group involvement.
28
If the Muhur approach were to be applied to political opinion cases, the
implication would be that there is no significant difference between
concealing political convictions and concealing religious beliefs. This
approach does not rely on the applicant's subjective reaction to the
government's actions, so it avoids struggling with the question of whether
keeping quiet about an opinion could be as "profoundly abhorrent" as
desecrating a holy object. Rather, the courts would focus on whether the
individual has genuine beliefs that he wishes to express but would face
'22 Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2004).
123 See, e.g., Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, 611 F.3d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that
determination of whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution depends on whether
someone in the applicant's situation would expect persecution, and therefore even a low-level
practitioner can establish a well-founded fear if the evidence shows that the police seek out and punish
low-level practitioners).
12, See supra Section HL.A.
125 See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 720 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Although Zhang testified that
Falun Gong is not a political organization, the authorities explicitly accused Zhang of participating in
anti-government activity, and the Chinese President announced that the anti-Falun Gong campaign was
a major political struggle.").
126 Qiu, 611 F.3d at 404.
'
27 Zhang, 388 F.3d at 720-21 ("Accordingly, we hold that Zhang is entitled to withholding of
removal on account of imputed political opinion and religion.").
12' In fact, the Ninth Circuit, while not ruling directly on the issue, has followed the reasoning in
Zhang to suggest that it is against the law's basic principles to require political dissidents to stop their




persecution if he were to express them.
An expansion of Muhur would recognize that it does not matter
whether an individual's beliefs are political or religious, because the
protection of both types of beliefs is central to the purpose of asylum law,
and people cannot reasonably be asked to suppress their views in order to
avoid persecution. The supposed distinction between these beliefs is
inconsistent with reality, as the line between religious communities and
political organizations is often blurred. For much of human history,
religious leaders have promoted political agendas, 2 9 and political figures
have often built quasi-religious cults of personality. 130 For many people, a
political ideology may serve the role of religion, providing rules and values
by which to live. In addition, some nations do not separate church and
state, and an objection to the practice of a theocratic regime can
simultaneously be political and religious, especially for women who are
often marginalized in such societies.1 3' Both religious and political beliefs
can properly be considered worldviews, and preventing one from
expressing a worldview could violate such a fundamental right that it
qualifies as constructive persecution. Therefore, the rule from Muhur
should be expanded to recognize that an applicant's ability to hide either a
political or a religious belief does not destroy her claim of a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of that belief.
V. ANALYSIS OF BOTH METHODS OF EXPANSION
Both the Muhur and the Fatin methods of interpreting asylum law in
the context of unexpressed political opinion would have far-reaching
consequences. A liberalized interpretation following the religion cases
from the Seventh Circuit would expand the class of people who could be
'29 In one recent extreme example, a Baptist pastor in North Carolina warned members of his
church not to vote for John Kerry in 2004 and then led a movement to expel those who did. Democrats
Voted Out of Church Because of Their Politics, Members Say, USA TODAY (May 7, 2005),
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nationl2005-05-07-church-politics x.htm.
130 E.g. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THANK You FATHER KIM IL SUNG:
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND
RELIGION IN NORTH KOREA 1, 73 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/nkwitnesses.pdf (discussing Kim I1 Sung in North Korea, and
stating, "the North Korean regime constructed and substituted an esoteric belief system that has
acquired many of the characteristics of a religious cult" and that "Thank you, Father Kim I1 Sung' is
the first phrase North Korean parents are instructed to teach to their children").
131 Cleaver, supra note 117, at 32 ("[l~n certain societies, the role ascribed to women may be
attributable to the requirements of the State or official religion. The authorities or other actors of
persecution may perceive the failure of a woman to conform to this role as the failure to practice or to
hold certain religious beliefs. At the same time, the failure to conform could be interpreted as holding
an unacceptable political opinion that threatens the basic structure from which certain political power
flows.") (quoting U.N. High Comm'r of Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-
Related Persecution Within the Context of Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 26, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002)).
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granted asylum. On the other hand, a Fatin-style "psychological
persecution" approach would effectively close the door on many political
activists fearing persecution. Regardless of the method, one must also
consider whether there is a dissimilarity between religious and political
views that might justify treating these protected grounds differently in the
context of asylum law. If political opinions by nature are more easily
concealed without violating an individual's deepest beliefs, then they may
be due less protection than religious beliefs receive under the Seventh
Circuit approach. This Part will explain, however, that religious and
political beliefs are similar enough to be treated equally, and as such,
constructive persecution is the most appropriate way to address the
concealment of these beliefs.
A. The Weaknesses of the Fatin Approach
1. Problems of Proof
The Fatin approach places too high a burden on the persecuted. That
is, treating concealment of political opinions as psychological persecution
only if it would be "profoundly abhorrent" to the applicant places an
unduly high burden on applicants attempting to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution. The burden is so high, in fact, that in every
asylum case in the United States that has followed Fatin, the court has
found that the applicant has failed to establish that adhering to the Islamic
laws would be so abhorrent to the applicant that it would constitute
persecution.
132
Even if an individual does feel profound abhorrence, she still has to
convince the judge that these emotions are genuine and rise to the level of
mental torture. It is difficult to definitively prove and corroborate
something as subjective as "profound abhorrence" in an applicant.
Because the standard turns on the unseen, internal reaction of the
individual, it can favor individuals who manifest more outward signs of
distress during their testimony, such as a quivering voice and an anxious
disposition. 33 A judge may be skeptical of an applicant with a calm
demeanor claiming that she suffers psychological persecution.
Nonetheless, she may still be suffering torment and merely masking her
anguish as a defense mechanism. Women who have suffered sexual
violence, but do not show any emotion during testimony, due to ongoing
trauma, fear, and humiliation, present a common example of this
132 See supra Section I1B.
133 See, e.g., Melinda McPherson et al., Marginal Women, Marginal Rights: Impediments to
Gender-Based Persecution Claims by Asylum-Seeking Women in Australia, 24 J. REFUGEE STUD. 323,
335 (2011) (noting that some asylum officers place importance on whether an applicant who alleges
that she has suffered domestic violence appears "visibly 'in distress').
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behavior.134  Expert testimony from a mental health professional might
help to show that mental suffering not reflected in an applicant's demeanor
is nonetheless real, 135 but expert conclusions based primarily on the
applicant's own statements invite skepticism and may still leave the judge
with doubts as to whether this emotional reaction actually satisfies the
legal standard of persecution. In addition, it can be difficult for both a
political opinion and a religion applicant to convince the judge that
keeping quiet constitutes torture when the applicant has nonetheless
endured it for a long period of time. Because of these evidentiary
problems with proving "profound abhorrence," the analysis often becomes
whether this abhorrence would compel the applicant to refuse to follow the
law and suffer the consequences.
136
2. Overreliance on Establishing a Refusal to Conform
The Fatin approach effectively asks the applicant to objectively
demonstrate the importance of her beliefs by refusing to conform to state
policies. In doing so, the Fatin approach essentially collapses into the
Mogharrabi approach by focusing on whether the government could
become aware of the applicant's view. An unexpressed political opinion
would only be protected when, according to the UNHCR, "it may be
reasonable to assume that his opinions will sooner or later find expression
and that the applicant will, as a result, come into conflict with the
authorities. ' 37  But Fatin's emphasis on an applicant's past refusal to
conform would narrow this realm of protection even further to individuals
who would intentionally, rather than accidentally, violate legal
prohibitions. The Fatin approach fails to account for individuals who
would not openly defy the government, but nevertheless may eventually
reveal their hidden views inadvertently, and therefore have no less of a
well-founded fear of persecution.
If Fatin is followed, dissidents should be evaluated based on their level
of mental torment in keeping quiet, not on their readiness to face
punishment for voicing their opinion. Critiquing the decision in Fatin, the
Seventh Circuit stated, in Yadegar-Sargis: "Although it would seem
appropriate to require that the government-imposed requirement be one
14 Id. at 335-36 (2011) (describing these feelings as preventing a reaction "stereotypically
considered appropriate").
35 See Linda Piwowarczyk, Seeking Asylum: A Mental Health Perspective, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
155, 157-60 (2001) (describing how common psychological responses to persecution, such as post-
traumatic stress disorder, can cause victims to become emotionally detached, and how an individual's
particular response is affected by cultural norms).
1
36 See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (highlighting the fact that the asylum
applicant failed to show that she was part of a group of Iranian women who [would] refuse to
conform with those [dress] requirements even if the consequences may be severe").
137 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 115, at 1 82.
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that affects a deeply held belief, it is unclear to us why the victims must be
willing to suffer whatever consequence may be visited on them as a
prerequisite to claiming persecution."' 38  Essentially, Fatin implied that
there is no great difference between feeling psychologically persecuted and
being compelled to act. As the court in Fatin stated, women who disobey
Islamic dress codes could be subject to punishment of "74 lashes, a year's
imprisonment, and in many cases brutal rapes and death.' 39  When the
punishment is so extreme, courts should not place such emphasis on the
willingness of applicants to endure it as a way of proving their
commitment to their cause before they are able to make a valid well-
founded fear claim.
B. Justifications for Expansion Under the Muhur Approach
If the courts simply applied the rule developed by the Seventh Circuit
in religion cases to political opinion claims, applicants would have a more
reasonable chance of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution.
They would be able to argue that being required to conceal their political
opinion "runs contrary to the language and purpose of our asylum laws"'
140
and therefore "is itself a form of persecution.' 14' The Seventh Circuit and
other courts have already embraced this idea in the context of religion.
The foregoing subsections argue that religion and political opinion should
be entitled to the same protection, and that this expansion is a logical
progression in asylum law, and an affirmation of both quintessentially
American values and international human rights principles.
1. Respecting Freedom of Speech
Both the U.S. Constitution and the international asylum regime
recognize the central importance of free speech. The First Amendment
states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 142 Since the
Founding, free speech has been regarded as a fundamental right, critical to
the functioning of a proper democracy and an enlightened populace. Butmillions of people around the world do not enjoy the right to freely express
138 Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 603 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002).
139 Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14, Fatin, 12 F.3d 1233 (No. 92-3346)).
140 Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, 611 F.3d 403,409 (7th Cir. 2010).
14' Kazemzadeh v. Att'y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1354 (11 th Cir. 2009).
142 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
143 Matthew Michael Calabria, Note, Remembering Democracy in the Debate Over Election
Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 827, 842 (2009) ("Among the rationales for free speech are the advancement of
individual autonomy, the discovery of truth, and the promotion of tolerance. But one of the strongest
explanations is that the right to free speech derives from the nature of democracy itself") (footnotes
omitted).
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themselves and assemble. Protecting these dissidents from suffering in
silence because they would fear retribution for speaking out affirms
important public policy goals. It sends a moral message about the
importance of free speech, exerts diplomatic pressure on autocratic
regimes, and may ultimately help to spread democracy.'44 Already, cases
following Muhur recognize the importance of preserving an individual's
fundamental right to practice her religion openly without fear of
persecution. 45 To require an individual to stifle her political expression to
avoid persecution would be just as contrary to the purpose of asylum law
and American values as requiring her to cease practicing her religion
openly.
It would likewise violate the very purpose of international refugee law,
as stated in the 1951 Convention, to require asylum petitioners to avoid
persecution by not exercising their fundamental right of political
expression.1 46  Under numerous international agreements, freedom of
expression is an essential human right to be advanced and protected by all
signatories. 147 In some countries, a duty is placed on asylum seekers to try
to seek protection within their own country by relocating to another area
where they may not be discovered and punished, a duty which has
sometimes threatened this essential principle.148  Courts in the United
"A MATTHEW E. PRICE, RETHINKING ASYLUM: HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND LIMITS 70 (2009) ("In
expressing condemnation, asylum also advances an instrumental goal, namely, the reform of
persecutory regimes. Asylum is thus part and parcel of a broad political program aimed at solving the
root causes of refugee flows by promoting the rule of law and human rights.").
1'4Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1358 (Marcus, J., concurring) ("The suggestion that a petitioner
seeking asylum on account of religious persecution may be required to practice his faith in the dead of
night collides with our nation's ideals about the exercise of religious freedom. The right to practice
only surreptitiously and under fear of death is not free exercise. Although I do not presume to
superimpose our Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence onto asylum law, the suggestion implicit in the
BIA's findings and in the government's argument contradicts both the values of our founders and the
values that the drafters of the Refugee Act of 1980 embodied when codifying the asylum sections of the
INA.") (citations omitted).
146 See Convention, supra note 21, at 13 ("Considering that the United Nations has, on various
occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavored to assure refugees the widest
possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms .. "); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF
REFUGEE STATUS 150 (1991) ("Since political expression is a core human right, the claimant must
enjoy a reasonable expectation of tolerance of peacefully articulated views. It is therefore inappropriate
simply to discount the risk of harm on the ground that the claimant could avoid detection by keeping
silent.").
147 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2 17(111), art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 19, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (also
affirming the universal right of freedom of expression).
148 James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an
Aspect of Refugee Status Determination, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 357, 357-
58 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003). In the United States, asylum protection is denied if it would be
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Kingdom, for example, have denied asylum to an individual who fled
persecution but then was able to avoid detection in another city by keeping
his political views hidden. 149  But asylum law is meant to safeguard the
fundamental rights and freedoms of refugees, and it violates this purpose to
deny protection to applicants just because they could secure their own
safety by not expressing these fundamental rights.15° As the Federal Court
of Australia has asserted in rejecting the argument that an individual
should be expected to relocate internally and avoid practicing his religion
so as to escape notice, "an assumption that a person with a strongly held
religious belief should act reasonably, and compromise that belief to avoid
persecution, would be contrary to the humanitarian objects of the
Convention."'' 51
A more recent asylum decision from the United Kingdom seems to
recognize this principle as well. 152 In that case, four Zimbabwean asylum
seekers argued that they should not be required to return to their country
and swear allegiance to the persecutory regime in order to escape
persecution.5 3  The Court of Appeal'5 4 agreed, holding that being
compelled to return to one's country and lie about one's political views,
solely to avoid persecution, violates the purpose of the Refugee
Convention. 55  Lying about political affiliation can be considered
equivalent to concealing one's true beliefs, as such, the U.K. court seems
to have recognized the Muhur concept as applied to political opinion.
American courts should follow suit.
The application of the Muhur approach to political opinion would
recognize that political opinion is not just an internal thought, but also a
worldview that finds expression in an individual's words and actions. A
democratic activist in North Korea, even if she could theoretically escape
detection for her views, should not be expected to keep the manifestations
of these views hidden. A court that asks her to return to North Korea and
reasonable "under all the circumstances" for the applicant to internally relocate. 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(l)(i)(B) (2010).
149 Hathaway & Foster, supra note 148, at 384 (describing a British case in which a Chinese
national for whom a warrant had been issued for displaying critical posters was denied asylum because
he was able to flee and stay in Shanghai for two months without being discovered by the police).
"So Id. at 385 ("It can never be acceptable for decision makers to require asylum seekers to avoid
persecution by denying their fundamental civil and political rights ... ").
1"1 Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 1599, 85 (Austl.)
(citing Omar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 1430, 42).
152 DI Manuel et al., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1285 (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/1285.html.
153 Id. at 4.
154 The Court of Appeal of England and Wales is the second highest court in the English legal
system. Glossary, JUDICIARY OF ENG. AND WALES, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/glossary (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).




simply keep quiet as long as she can avoid persecution completely misses
the point of asylum law and sends the wrong message to the rest of the
world about how the United States and the international community value
freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is considered so important in the
United States that the Framers ensured its inclusion in the Constitution, and
the Supreme Court has repeatedly protected it-along with other forms of
expression.156 It may, therefore, be so fundamental that, under the Muhur
reasoning, violation of such a right cannot be asked of asylum seekers to
avoid persecution.
2. The Similarities Between Religion and Political Opinion
Expanding the Muhur approach ultimately rests on the presupposition
that concealed religious and political beliefs are due the same form of
asylum protection. Both religious and political ideologies seek to explain
the world and provide rules on how individuals ought to live or society
ought to be organized.'57 Political and religious groups often have
organization, hierarchy, and a sense of community. Both types of
ideologies also contain sets of core, defining values, such as charity or
personal autonomy. To the member of a particular religious or political
belief system, these values may guide the most basic of decisions, like
where they work, what they eat, and how they treat other people.'5t Just as
a Muslim may assert that praying on the floor several times a day is a
manifestation of her Islamic faith, so too may a Socialist argue that
organizing labor unions is based on the essential Socialist value of
workers' rights. These values are highly visible in that practicing them
will often manifest publicly, giving away the individual's motivation for
her actions. Whether religious or political, to devoted adherents these
values are "fundamental to their individual identities or consciences,"'59
and it could be exceptionally difficult to change or hide them even under
threat of persecution.
The United States permits free speech and freedom of religion within
156 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (holding that the First Amendment
protects the transmission of indecent material on the interet); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
312 (1990) (holding that flag burning is a protected form of expression under the First Amendment);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment protects limitless
expenditures on political campaigns).
157 "Religion" is defined as "a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes,
beliefs, and practices" or "a cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to with ardor and faith" and
"ideology" is defined as "a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture" and
"the integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 119, at 616, 1051-52.
5
' LEONARD M. HAMMER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
121 (2001) (describing how non-religious beliefs, such as veganism or pacifism, can manifest in
external actions).
159 In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
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its borders, and asylum status is granted to prevent people from other
countries from being denied these rights. It would be entirely inconsistent
with the tradition of asylum law and the values espoused in American
political rhetoric to decide that an individual is entitled to asylum if she can
avoid persecution by hiding her religion, but not her political opinion. The
similarities between the two simply do not warrant a legal distinction.
C. Criticism of Expansion Under the Seventh Circuit Approach
1. The Possible Distinction Between Religion and Political Opinion
One might argue that religion and political opinion are so different that
the constructive persecution concept should not be expanded to include
suppression of political views. First, it is important to note that individuals
are usually born into religious groups, and socialized into traditions that are
often handed down from generation to generation. 160  Even in a liberal
democracy like the United States, between seventy and ninety percent of
adults self-identify with the religious tradition of their childhood. 161 In
contrast, individuals are not born as socialists or democrats, and they
generally choose to become politically active later in life. Second, an
individual's family, neighborhood, or physical characteristics may reveal
that she is part of a certain religious community, but members of political
groups may not be as easily recognizable. Political beliefs are also
considered much more fluid than religious beliefs. In democratic systems,
political parties have evolving positions and regularly compromise over
issues, while religious organizations adhere to a set of doctrines which are
usually non-negotiable.'62
Religious views, it can be argued, are intrinsically much more visible
than political views because they usually involve more traditions that affect
what people wear or how they act. The cross, yarmulke, and burqa, for
example, are all instantly recognizable symbols that reveal the faith of the
wearer. Political symbols, such as a swastika or a hammer and sickle, are
forms of expression-rather than traditional practices-that are central to
the belief. Religious individuals may also have practices, such as praying
before a meal or refusing to eat pork, that indicate their faith to others in
public. A political individual may choose to announce her views to others
but is not obligated to by any higher power. It has also been argued that
religion, because it concerns eschatology and the supernatural, necessarily
causes behavior that is perceived as irrational and sometimes even
'6 Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and
Women's Equality, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459, 513-14 (2004).
161 ld at 513.




destructive, such that a religious viewpoint is more likely to draw the
attention of others than a secular one.163 These distinctions, taken together
and compared to a religious membership, can be interpreted to show that a
political opinion is much more easily concealed without breaking the
individual's commitment.
On closer analysis, though, each of these distinctions is either
inaccurate or insignificant. While many people are born into a religion,
conversions are not uncommon. As such, a persecutor may not necessarily
know the intended victim's religious affiliation based simply on her family
or where she was born. People may be born into circumstances where
certain political views and associations are encouraged, and this could
form a part of the person's identity from an early age. 164 Political beliefs
are not necessarily more fluid than religion; politicians on the far right or
left may be just as entrenched in their views as a religious fanatic. 165 It is
also shortsighted to argue that an individual can more easily hide her
political view compared to her religious view. In the United States,
freedom of speech is often taken for granted, and Americans can believe in
a liberal democracy without having to fight for it. A liberal democrat in a
Communist country, on the other hand, lacks the free speech to even assert
this view, and may be more likely to value publicly demonstrating for that
belief.
In addition, the assertion that religious beliefs by nature compel more
highly-noticeable, irrational, and destructive acts fails to consider that
political motivations have been behind some of history's largest programs
of destruction, as evidenced by the several infamous examples of brutal
twentieth-century genocides. 166  Both religious and political philosophies
influence people's actions and have been exploited by malevolent leaders
163 See Gidon Sapir, Religion and State-A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579,
641 (1999) (explaining the argument that religion is due special treatment because religious conscience
"represents deference to a god, while [secular conscience] is merely the result of individual
autonomous decision"); see also Ryan Spear, Book Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About
God, I HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 495, 500-01 (2007) (describing Richard Dawkins's view of religion as
a form of derangement that causes the believer to think and act irrationally).
'6 In Israel, political parties are so institutionally and culturally entrenched that most citizens are
actually bom into political parties. Jayanth Kumar Krishnan, Public Interest Litigation in a
Comparative Context, 20 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 19, 24 (2001-2002) (citing Deborah Sontag, In Close
Israeli Race, Russian Voters Hold the Key, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1999, at A3).
165 In fact, a majority of Americans prefer politicians who adhere to their positions rather than
compromise with people they disagree with. FEWER ARE ANGRY AT GOVERNMENT, BUT DISCONTENT
REMAINS HIGH, PEW RES. CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/3-3-1 l%20Political%20Release.pdf (reporting that fifty-
four percent of those surveyed liked elected officials who "stick to their positions" while forty percent
of those surveyed like elected officials who "make compromises with people they disagree with").
166 Spear, supra note 163, at 500 ("More generally, hasn't the twentieth century taught us that
murderous outrages hardly require religious justifications? Surely that is one of the bitter lessons of the
genocides in Germany, Cambodia, Iraq, and Rwanda.").
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to justify horrendous acts. There is no objective reason why a political
opinion would be inherently less visible than religious affiliation; in fact,
political dissidents who actively denounce the government probably come
to the attention of the authorities much faster than peacefully meditating
monks. Political activists may believe that wearing their affiliation on their
sleeve is necessary for a true believer in the cause, even though no
supernatural power or sacred text instructs them to do so.
2. The "Floodgates "Argument
Critics of expanding the Seventh Circuit approach to include political
opinion may voice concerns about opening the "floodgates" of litigation
such that immigration judges would be overwhelmed with asylum
applications. 167 Judge Posner realized this concern in Iao, speculating in
dictum that:
The number of followers of Falun Gong in China is
estimated to be in the tens of millions, all of them subject
to persecution.... Anyone, we suppose, can get hold of a
book of Li Hongzhi's teachings, start doing the exercises,
and truthfully declare himself or herself a bona fide
adherent to Falun Gong. The implications for potential
Chinese immigration to the United States may be
significant ....168
At the time of Judge Posner's comments, there had been only a few Falun
Gong cases, and he did not foresee a sudden deluge of applications. 169
Falun Gong members are still persecuted, though, and in 2010 the Seventh
Circuit repeated Judge Posner's concern without further comment. 170  If
political groups are subject to the same protection, it will become even
easier for Chinese dissidents to assert their critical views and petition for
protection from having to conceal them, and the courts could face millions
more applicants looking for an easy way into the United States.
A related concern is that protection could extend to even the least
politically active individuals. After all, in cases like Qiu and Iao, low-level
Falun Gong practitioners who merely attended meetings and performed
167 For a fascinating deconstruction of the "flood of immigration" metaphor as used in United
States Supreme Court opinions, see Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration
Metaphors and the Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545, 1549-50 (2011).
168 lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005).
169 See id ("[[]n this circuit there have been only two litigated applications for asylum based on
fear of persecution for being an adherent ... of Falun Gong ... and in the federal courts as a whole
there have been only a couple of dozen such cases since 2003.") (internal citations omitted).
170 Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, 611 F.3d 403,408-09 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting lao, 400 F.3d at 533).
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exercises were protected. 7' This could mean that even inactive supporters
of political opposition groups would be eligible for asylum. If anyone in a
country of 1.3 billion people could show up to an underground democracy
meeting or sign a petition, then migrate to the U.S. and demand asylum,
the possible flood of immigrants would be astronomical.
172
These ominous arguments make it seem improbably easy to state a
claim of political persecution and gain asylum. An expanded constructive
persecution approach would increase the number of eligible applicants, but
it is unlikely that there will be a significantly greater flow of immigrants
who are able to truthfully assert a hidden, deeply held political ideology
that invites persecution. 173 The applicant still needs to enter the United
States before applying for asylum. Obtaining a visa is highly competitive
and illegal methods can be dangerous and costly. Once in the United
States, the applicant then has the burden of establishing that she holds a
political opinion for which the government would persecute her, and that
the only way to avoid this persecution would be to keep quiet about her
views. If she can satisfy the fact-finder that these assertions are correct,
then she would justifiably be eligible for asylum under such an approach.
Fact-finders are trained to test the truth and consistency of an applicant's
testimony so that an individual who fakes allegiance to a banned political
group just to obtain asylum will often be discovered and denied asylum. In
addition, anti-fraud and security safeguards help to catch untruthful
applications and ensure the authenticity of an applicant's claim. 
1 74
Where the applicant has not expressed her opinion, distinguishing
between a fearful dissident with genuine concealed beliefs and an
opportunistic immigrant inventing a political stance is more difficult, but
this will again be within the purview of the fact-finder. 75  It would not
'7' Qiu, 611 F.3d at 407; lao, 400 F.3d at 531.
172 There are, for example, thousands of Chinese citizens who signed Charter 08, a pro-democracy
petition co-authored by recent Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo. Austin Ramzy, Chinese Dissident Liu
Xiaobo Wins Nobel Peace Prize, TIME, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/wordd/
article/0,8599,2024405,00.html. Most of the original signers were arrested and harassed by the police,
while Liu himself was sentenced to eleven years in prison. Id
13 It should be noted that in a similar situation, when Canada began accepting a new category of
asylum claims based on domestic violence, it did not experience an overwhelming flood of such cases.
Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental Brief at 13 n.10 (BLA 2009) (respondent
anonymous), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted DHS brief on PSG.pdf.
174 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE: DENYING PROTECTION TO THE
PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY 26-28 (2010), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/afd.pdf (discussing the many safeguards in
asylum law added by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act or afterwards,
such as asylum applications being signed under penalty of perjury, allowing the prosecution of
fraudulent asylum application filers, preparers, or attorneys, and requiring FBI fingerprint and name
checks for all applicants).
75 A parallel can be drawn with the difficulty in determining the true religious faith of the
applicant, when he claims a fear of persecution after converting to a new religion. Najafi v. INS, 104
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create an excessive burden as judges already regularly make credibility
findings. 76 If the applicant is objectively credible and displays a genuine
personal belief that she is too afraid to express because of the threat of
government retaliation, then the judge could reasonably conclude that she
has a well-founded fear.' 77  Establishing credibility before the judge is
often a laborious task for applicants who have already suffered greatly, but
it guarantees that asylum is only available for those who have been
deprived of their right to free expression of their strongly-held political
beliefs, which are the type of dissidents that asylum law is meant to
protect. 78 None of these concerns, therefore, would legitimately forestall
extending the Muhur approach to protect political opinion.
Asylum law already protects people who hold a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of their political opinion. Applying the expansive
Seventh Circuit view that has developed in religion cases to political
opinion claims would affirm the fundamental right of political expression
by not expecting dissidents to keep quiet as a way to escape harm. While
the court in Fatin warned that "persecution does not encompass all
treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or
unconstitutional,"' 79 suppression of individual religious and political views
contravenes not only American values, but international human rights
norms as well.180 Any burden on the system caused by a modestly higher
rate of successful applications is far outweighed by the interests in
reducing political oppression and affirming the fundamental importance of
freedom of speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
Asylum law in the United States developed in response to the pressing
F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Determination of a religious faith by a tribunal is fraught with
complexity as true belief is not readily justiciable."). In conversion cases, the court looks for outward
"indicia of apostasy," id., but external manifestations of a political opinion are obviously not available
to corroborate the claim of an applicant holding an unexpressed opinion.
176 See Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in
Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 368 (2003) (discussing the importance of
credibility findings in asylum cases, especially since there is usually a dearth of corroborating
evidence).
177 See id. at 381 (explaining the objective credibility approach, which focuses on whether an
applicant could be believed by a reasonable person and attempts to separate from the analysis the
personal biases and intuition of the immigration judge).
178 See PRICE, supra note 144, at 57 (noting that since the late eighteenth century, asylum has
focused on protecting "'political offenders' who had justifiably rebelled against autocratic rle and
were sought for extradition" and that this focus on political morality has deep historical roots).
179 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).
S0 See Convention, supra note 21, at Preamble ("Considering that the United Nations has, on
various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavored to assure refugees the
widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms ....").
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need for humanitarian responses to international crises and oppressive
regimes. It created a formalized procedure for evaluating the claims of
refugees and offered protective status to those who hold a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion. In affirming the protection
of these five characteristics, the BIA has noted that these are qualities so
central to an individual's identity that they cannot be changed or should not
be expected to change. 8' The First Amendment also reveals the
importance of safeguarding an individual's free expression and conscience,
whether political or religious.
Concealing an individual's beliefs could constitute either
psychological or constructive persecution. Fatin recognizes that violating
one's beliefs may be so "profoundly abhorrent" as to rise to the level of
psychological persecution, but such a subjective analysis imposes a heavy
burden on the applicant, and creates a headache for the courts. If Fatin
becomes the standard in political opinion cases, it would likely only protect
the boldest, most fanatical activists. A more sensible approach would be to
label concealment of beliefs as constructive persecution, because
concealment is fundamentally at odds with asylum law principles and the
applicant would effectively be compelled to face persecution at the hands
of the authorities. Muhur implicitly relies on such a theory, standing for
the proposition that an individual is entitled to asylum even if she could
avoid persecution by keeping her religious beliefs quiet-if she would be
persecuted if she did practice as she wished.
The same protection should be offered to those who fear persecution
because of their political opinion. Political and religious philosophies both
contain practices, beliefs, and values that guide an individual's decisions;
asking someone to conceal either would be both injurious and extremely
difficult. As proponents of free speech, it would be hypocritical for the
United States to send an applicant with critical views of his government
back to his country and instruct him to keep quiet. Protecting dissidents
from being placed in a catch-22 choice between persecution and
concealment thus prevents both constructive persecution and the risk of
discovery and punishment by the authorities. Although an expansive
approach could cause a greater flow of asylum applicants, it would
acknowledge the importance of political expression and ensure equal
protection for religious and political devotees under asylum law.
Muhur and its progeny have boldly protected individuals from having
to return to their country and conceal their religion even if they could avoid
persecution. Going forward, applying this approach to political opinion
181 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,233 (BIA 1985).
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would be both an entirely appropriate interpretation and a powerful
testament to the American conception of justice.
